Generally Applicable Law and the Free Exercise of Religion
Douglas Laycock et al.
I. Introduction
II. Free Exercise of Religion in the Age of Smith
III. Two Requirements with Distinct Content ... A. Neutrality ... B. General Applicability
IV. Elaborating General Applicability ... A. Arguments for Minimizing the Requirement of General Applicability: Stormans v. Wiesman ... B. Reasonable Exceptions ... C. Circular Categories and Circular Government Interests ... D. Secular Exceptions Not Stated in the Law’s Text ... E. Rules That Apply to Most but Not All Analogous Secular Conduct ... F. Laws with a Single Secular Exception That Undermines the State’s Interests
V. Underlying Reasons ... A. Value Judgments about Religion ... B. Vicarious Political Protection for Religious Minorities ... C. The Level of Protection
VI. Conclusion
Evidence—The Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act Applied to Medical Records
Howard E. Tracy
In Fries v. Goldsby, decided in December 1956, the Nebraska Supreme Court held, inter alia, that a chiropractor’s permanent record of plaintiff’s history, examination, diagnosis, care, and treatment were not admissible into evidence under the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act. Because the court treated the chiropractor as an expert in his field, this holding probably applies to other medical witnesses who testify as experts in their fields of knowledge. Thus, the court has seemingly held that the permanent records of physicians, surgeons, and dentists do not fall within the purview of the Uniform Act. This note is a discussion of that holding.
The Right to Change Defense or Claim by Amendments to the Pleadings
John C. McElhaney
I. Amendments Generally
II. Change in Defense Pleaded from That Used in Pre-Trial Negotiations
III. Amendments after Appeal—General
IV. Amendments after Remand—Specific Examples
V. Conclusion
Duty of Farm Tractor Operators to Infant Passengers
Duane L. Nelson
I. Operator’s Status as Occupier of Land
II. Applicability of the Guest Statute
III. Conclusion
Reciprocal Trusts—A Tax Avoidance Device with Recuperative Powers
Philip G. Johnson
I. The Lehman Doctrine Prior to the Technical Changes Act of 1949
II. The Lehman Doctrine Subsequent to the Technical Changes Act of 1949
III. Conclusion
Jerome Frank’s Attack on the “Myth” of Legal Certainty
Julius Paul
One of the significant contributions of contemporary American legal realism has been the discussion of the origins, purpose, and efficacy of legal rules. Some writers have been extremely critical of the worship of legal rules and of the feeling by the lay public that rules can provide exactness and certainty in the law. Jerome Frank has been the most noteworthy exponent of this view, particularly in his pioneer book, Law and the Modern Mind, published in 1930.
Frank would be the last person to deny the existence and the utility of legal rules. Yet, his attack on those writers who see only the legal rules and nothing else as law (especially the late Professor Joseph Beale) has led some writers to believe that Frank wanted a legal system that operated on a purely pragmatic basis. Frank fervently denies this accusation and says that men like Gray, Wigmore, and Judge Cuthbert Pound expressed similar doubts about the prediction value of legal rules and precedents.
The Final Judgment Rule and Appellate Review of Discovery Orders in Nebraska
William H. Sherwood et al.
In Lund v. Holbrook the Nebraska Supreme Court held that no appeal could be taken until after final judgment from an order requiring a party to turn over documents to his opponent for inspection and copying. The basis for the decision was a statute limiting the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court to the review of a “judgment rendered or final order.” “Final order” is defined by statute as one which “ . . . in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment.” The same rule would undoubtedly by applied to any other discovery order in Nebraska.
This “final judgment” rule exists in some form in almost every state. The application of the rule in Lund v. Holbrook is in line with the rulings of the majority of states as to discovery orders. The purpose of the rule is to reduce the volume of appeals which would, in the absence of the rule, clog the calendars of appellate courts and cause interminable delay in litigation.
Many states have modified the final judgment rule by statute to allow immediate appeal from specified orders which are not reviewable under the majority rule until after final judgment. The reason for these modifications may be either that the final judgment rule does not fulfill its purposes, or that the assumption underlying the rule (i.e., that the effect of any error on the part of the trial court can be remedied by a new trial) has proved to be untrue.
The decision in Lund v. Holbrook illustrates another type of order, the discovery order, which may be worthy of consideration as justifying a departure from the final judgment rule. We propose to examine:
(a) the effect of the final judgment rule in cases involving discovery orders, to determine whether departure from the final judgment rule is justified,
(b) the means presently existing in Nebraska for avoiding the effect of the final judgment rule as to discovery orders, and
(c) the desirability of, and possibilities for statutory modification of the final judgment rule as to discovery orders in Nebraska.
Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719 (D. Neb. 2014): Preserving the Right to Tell Your Employers What They Do Not Want to Hear
Kelsey E. B. Knoer
Should internal whistle-blowers be awarded the anti-retaliation protections under Dodd-Frank? This Note analyzes how the Federal District Court for the District of Nebraska's interpretation of anti-retaliation provision will preserve the integrity of whistle-blowing programs and protect those employees most in need of protection from retaliation.
The Animal Welfare Act at Fifty: Problems and Possibilities in Animal Testing Regulation
Courtney G. Lee
I. Introduction
II. Background of the Animal Welfare Act ... A. Enactment and Evolution ... B. Early Amendments ... C. Improved Standards for Laboratory Animals Act of 1985 ... D. Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees ... E. IACUC Effectiveness
III. Coverage of the AWA ... A. What Is an “Animal” under the AWA? ... B. Legislative Background of the Definition ... C. Sentience of Unprotected Species
IV. The Effectiveness and Necessity of Animal Testing ... A. Is Animal Experimentation Effective? ... B. Alternatives to Animal Testing ... 1. In Vitro Testing ... 2. In Silico Testing ... 3. Alternative Testing Advancements in Toxicology
V. Laboratory Testing in Other Countries ... A. The European Union ... B. Other Countries ... C. Cosmetics Testing in the United States
VI. “Spent” Animals
VII. Recommendations ... A. Expand the Definition of “Animal” ... B. Increase the Diversity and Power of IACUCs … C. Strengthen Commitment to the Three Rs ... D. Include a Provision Encouraging Adoption for Spent Animals
VIII. Conclusion
Al Maqaleh and the Diminishing Reach of Habeas Corpus
Rehan Abeyratne
I. Introduction
II. Al Maqaleh: Background and Procedural History … A. Facts of the Case ... B. The Four Major Opinions ... 1. Al Maqaleh I ... 2. Al Maqaleh II ... 3. Al Maqaleh III ... 4. Al Maqaleh IV
III. Revisiting the Site of Apprehension and Site of Detention Factors ... A. Site of Apprehension ... B. Site of Detention ... 1. Is Sovereignty a Necessary Condition for Writ Jurisdiction? ... a. De Facto Sovereignty ... b. Eistentrager’s Holding ... 2. Conflating Degree and Duration of Control ... 3. A “Permanent” U.S. Presence at Bagram
IV. When Practical Obstacles Become Practically Insurmountable ... A. Overstated Obstacles in Al Maqaleh: A Closer Inspection of the Facts ... B. Practical Obstacles as Separation of Powers Concerns
V. Executive Manipulation of Writ Jurisdiction ... A. Evidence of Manipulation ... B. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report
VI. Conclusion: The Diminishing Reach of the Writ of Habeas Corpus