Who's Afraid of Little Old Me? The Record Industry: Protecting Creativity and Promoting Artists' Rights Through a Narrow Scope of 17 U.S.C. §§ 103 and 114 Rights for Derivative Works
Margaret Fouberg, J.D. Candidate, 2025, University of Nebraska College of Law
This Comment explores the growing conversation surrounding artist rights and music ownership, catalyzed by Taylor Swift’s public dispute with Big Machine Records. Swift’s efforts to reclaim her work have spotlighted the complexities of U.S. copyright law, particularly the distinct rights afforded to sound recordings versus musical compositions under the Sound Recording Act of 1971. By examining derivative works and their required standard of originality, this Comment argues that a narrow interpretation of copyright protections for derivative works, as outlined in 17 U.S.C. §§ 103 and 114, is essential for fostering creativity and safeguarding artists’ rights. Through an analysis of legislative history, judicial precedent, and the broader implications for originality, this paper underscores the importance of protecting artistry while balancing the rights of creators and producers.
Wife, Mother, Worst of the Worst: America's Death Penalty Schemes as Gendered and Arbitrary
Abby Slyter, J.D. Candidate, 2025, University of Nebraska College of Law
The legal landscape surrounding capital punishment in the United States has evolved significantly since its inception, and women's status on death row has not been left untouched by these developments. Following the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Furman v. Georgia, the constitutionality of the death penalty as it applies to women has faced increased scrutiny.
This Comment explores the history of capital punishment for women, the status of women on death row as of March 2024, and analyzes capital punishment sentencing as a gendered process through the Chivalry and Evil Woman Theories. An examination of Furman and subsequent cases shows that contemporary death penalty practices are often gendered, potentially rendering them arbitrary and capricious. While women on death row are not a monolith, this Comment highlights the gendered application of capital punishment in America and emphasizes the urgent need to address these issues, as women continue to be sentenced to death.
When One Door Closes: Legal Education and Racial Justice after Students for Fair Admissions
Michael I. Meyerson, University of Baltimore School of Law
In Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, the Supreme Court ruled that the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited colleges and universities from using race as a factor in admissions decisions. Many have feared that this ruling portends the end of racial diversity in higher education. Law schools, however, can choose to treat this decision as creating a fresh opportunity to pursue racial justice in a comprehensive and meaningful way. Most of the early scholarly writing on Students for Fair Admissions focused on either its shortcomings or the narrow issue of academic admissions policies. These initial analyses did not examine two critical facts. First, prior to the Court’s decision, most law school practices were far from ideal and frequently reinforced structural racism. Second, law schools can use Students for Fair Admissions as an impetus for making changes to those harmful practices.
This Article demonstrates how law schools can take full advantage of that opportunity. First, it explains how the Court’s decision in Students for Fair Admissions preserves law schools’ ability to pursue racial justice, especially with schools no longer needing to restrict their actions to meet the Court’s previous constrained diversity model. Next, this Article details the need for changing the ways in which most law schools currently contribute to the legal profession’s status as America’s “whitest profession.” Finally, it provides a wide range of actions, in areas including student recruitment, admissions policies, law school culture, faculty hiring, bar exams, U.S. News rankings, and law firm practices, that law schools can undertake to advance racial justice in a post-Students for Fair Admissions world.
Adapting Gingles & Retaining Voter Power: Applying the VRA to State Judicial Retention Elections
Jake Mazeitis
State supreme courts play a crucial yet overlooked role in our nation’s judiciary. They are also predominantly White. In states with judicial elections, this racial homogeneity suggests that voters of color may not have an equal opportunity to “elect representatives of their choice” as required by the Voting Rights Act. While federal courts frequently apply the VRA to judicial elections resembling legislative and executive contests, those same tribunals have failed to protect voters of color in non-competitive judicial retention elections. This failure is due in part to Thornburg v. Gingles, which established three threshold requirements for plaintiffs in vote dilution cases. These factors, which focus on a given plaintiff’s ability to craft a majority-minority district within the relevant multi-member elected body, do little to aid courts in judicial retention election cases because Gingles presumes the existence of geographic districts and a choice between candidates. Judicial retention elections possess neither of those qualities. Despite Gingles’ inapplicability, lower federal courts have often mechanically applied the Gingles factors in judicial retention cases, creating insurmountable hurdles for plaintiffs bringing claims. In contravention of basic legal principles, these decisions declare that there is a right, but no associated remedy. This Article advances a new reading of Gingles, a reading that both aligns with Supreme Court caselaw and ensures that voters of color in judicial retention elections can obtain meaningful relief when denied the ability to select a representative of their choice.
Wrongful Birth after Dobbs and the Limits of Tort Law in Areas of Dissensus
E. Travis Ramey, University of Alabama School of Law
As the abortion debate has raged in this country, a secondary debate over wrongful birth has accompanied it. Wrongful birth is a medical malpractice-like claim brought by parents who allege that a medical provider negligently failed to provide accurate information about the fetus and that had they received accurate information they would have terminated the pregnancy. Courts rejected the tort theory until Roe v. Wade was decided. Post-Roe, courts were heavily divided over whether to recognize the claim and what damages were recoverable. Now, after Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, the continued viability of wrongful birth is in question, and the already chaotic nature of wrongful birth has become even more complex.
This Article examines wrongful birth and its criticisms before examining the effect Dobbs is likely to have on wrongful birth jurisprudence. It concludes that wrongful birth will remain unchanged in jurisdictions that do not restrict abortion. And it suggests analyses that might permit wrongful birth to remain viable in jurisdictions that ban abortion, though doing so concededly adds to the dissensus surrounding wrongful birth.
Most importantly, the Article examines why wrongful birth has resisted judicial consensus. Instead of simply blaming the heated abortion debate, it concludes that social dissensus about multiple issues makes regulating wrongful birth through tort law inappropriate. Recognizing and accepting the limitations of tort law that wrongful birth exposes is important given that other looming technological developments—such as artificial intelligence and transhumanist ideas to expand human capabilities—promise to raise again and again the same dissensus problem that wrongful birth highlights.
Incentivizing Accelerated Federal Student Loan Repayment, a Small Change
Steve Lydick, Erickson Sederstrom, PC, LLO, Omaha, Nebraska
This Comment suggests incentivizing accelerated repayment as a practical solution to provide relief to stakeholders in the federal student loan program. By using its existing legal authority, the Department of Education can permit borrowers to satisfy their loan obligations through partial overpayments. This strategy allows borrowers to play a more active role in expediting their loan repayment, benefiting both the borrowers and the Department.
The Unsettled State of Corporate General Personal Jurisdiction
Anthony J. Gaughan
This Article examines Mallory’s unsettling ramifications for corporate general personal jurisdiction. It proceeds in four parts. Part I explains the rationale behind the Court’s ruling. Part II examines the judicial uncertainty and inconsistent rulings that plagued corporate general personal jurisdiction before Goodyear. Part III argues that the Goodyear trilogy brought long overdue stability, consistency, and predictability to corporate general jurisdiction. When combined with the Court’s recent clarification of specific jurisdiction’s scope, Goodyear and its companion cases placed plaintiffs and defendants on a level playing field. But the Mallory decision destroys that equilibrium and creates a new era of instability in corporate general jurisdiction. Part IV warns of the consequences if the Court fails to salvage at least some of the stability achieved by the Goodyear trilogy. As Justice Alito noted in his concurring opinion in Mallory, there is a strong case to be made that general-jurisdiction-by-registration statutes violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. At present, however, Mallory clears the way for legislatures to coerce foreign corporations to consent to all-purpose jurisdiction without running afoul of the Due Process Clause. Left unchecked, the ruling will give rise to a patchwork quilt of conflicting general jurisdiction rules and questionable choice-of-law determinations. Mallory may thus go down in history as the case that turned the clock back to the unsettled pre-Goodyear era of corporate general jurisdiction.
Funding Futurist Ideas
David Nows
Borrowing from the templates created by the United States through its Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs, as well as global programs run through organizations like the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), this article advocates for a novel international grant funding program for new entrepreneurial ventures that seek to provide solutions to significant global challenges. Using the United Nations (U.N.) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as a guide, this article is the first to propose a framework for funding new entrepreneurial ventures that do not meet the traditional criteria of financial investors but seek to solve important future-facing global problems. While past scholarship has addressed the strengths and weaknesses of investment and grant funding options for new ventures, this article significantly contributes to the literature by combining many of these scholarly ideas into a comprehensive program that would provide necessary capital to world-changing entrepreneurs who would otherwise not receive funding.
Shared Housing as a Missing Middle Solution for Rural Communities
Alison Lintal
This Article demonstrates that shared housing, particularly among seniors, can be a successful model for providing affordable housing in rural areas. It will identify and examine the legal impediments to implementing shared housing programs which include: (1) failure to meet building code and internal density requirements; (2) antiquated definitions of family and cohabitation under zoning laws with a need for statutory permission for unrelated people desiring to live together; (3) restrictive occupancy codes; (4) property and income tax consequences as well as impact on public benefits eligibility; (5) lack of traditional landlord tenant protections for informal shared housing arrangements; and (6) limited fair housing protections for shared housing arrangements. In addition, funding and financing shared housing under current conventional and government financing structures presents challenges.
Enforcing the ADA: How the Eighth Circuit Has Interpreted Undue Hardship to Employers When Examining Mandatory Reassignment as a Reasonable Accommodation Under the ADA—Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
Matthew Zabek
In Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the Eighth Circuit joined a circuit split regarding whether it is mandatory under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 for an employer to accommodate a disabled employee by reassigning them to a vacant position, even if they are not the most qualified individual available to fill that position. The Eighth Circuit asserts that the ADA is an anti-discrimination statute, and therefore should not impose automatic employment preferences like mandatory reassignment. Courts on the opposite side of the split have held that the ADA requires mandatory reassignment because if it did not, the reassignment provision would lack meaning and enforceability. While Huber continues to embody the stance of the Eighth Circuit, other courts have continued to uphold mandatory reassignment under the ADA with legal analysis and argument that was not considered by the Eighth Circuit. This Note provides background and analysis of the ADA and the circuit split regarding mandatory reassignment and provides an argument that the Eighth Circuit should reevaluate its position opposing mandatory reassignment as a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.